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Adición de bibliografía

NikaZhenya authored on 13/06/2018 23:13:35
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-% Encoding: UTF-8
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-
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-@Online{swartz2008,
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-  author    = {Swartz, Aaron},
5
-  title     = {Guerilla Open Access Manifesto},
6
-  year      = {2008},
7
-  date      = {2017-07-01},
8
-  url       = {https://archive.org/stream/GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto/Goamjuly2008_djvu.txt},
9
-  urldate   = {2017-11-13},
10
-  file      = {:recursos/swartz2008.html:URL},
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-  timestamp = {2017-11-13},
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-}
13
-
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-@InBook{marx1999,
15
-  author    = {Marx, Karl},
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-  title     = {El capital},
17
-  year      = {1999},
18
-  volume    = {1},
19
-  publisher = {\textsc{fce}},
20
-  location  = {México},
21
-  chapter   = {La mercancía},
22
-  pages     = {3--47},
23
-  url       = {https://github.com/NikaZhenya/maestria-asignaturas/raw/master/semestre_1/63044_t112_seminario_mercancia-capital-y-cinematografia/bibliografia/marx_karl-el_capital-libro1_vol1.epub},
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-  urldate   = {2017-12-12},
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-  file      = {:recursos/marx1999.epub:ePUB},
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-  timestamp = {2017-12-12},
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-}
28
-
29
-@InCollection{stallman2016,
30
-  author    = {Stallman, Richard},
31
-  title     = {El manifiesto de GNU},
32
-  booktitle = {¿Propiedad intelectual?},
33
-  year      = {2016},
34
-  date      = {2016-05-08},
35
-  subtitle  = {Una recopilación de ensayos críticos},
36
-  edition   = {1},
37
-  publisher = {Perro Triste},
38
-  location  = {México},
39
-  isbn      = {9786079718404},
40
-  pages     = {5--32},
41
-  url       = {https://archive.org/details/PropiedadIntelectual},
42
-  urldate   = {2017-11-13},
43
-  file      = {:recursos/pi.epub:ePUB},
44
-  timestamp = {2017-11-13},
45
-}
46
-
47
-@InCollection{barlow2016,
48
-  author    = {Barlow, John P.},
49
-  title     = {Vender vino sin botellas},
50
-  booktitle = {¿Propiedad intelectual?},
51
-  year      = {2016},
52
-  date      = {2016-05-08},
53
-  subtitle  = {Una recopilación de ensayos críticos},
54
-  edition   = {1},
55
-  publisher = {Perro Triste},
56
-  location  = {México},
57
-  isbn      = {9786079718404},
58
-  pages     = {33--96},
59
-  url       = {https://archive.org/details/PropiedadIntelectual},
60
-  urldate   = {2017-11-13},
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-  file      = {:recursos/pi.epub:ePUB},
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-  timestamp = {2017-11-13},
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-}
64
-
65
-@InCollection{raymond2016,
66
-  author    = {Raymond, Eric S.},
67
-  title     = {La catedral y el bazar},
68
-  booktitle = {¿Propiedad intelectual?},
69
-  year      = {2016},
70
-  date      = {2016-05-08},
71
-  subtitle  = {Una recopilación de ensayos críticos},
72
-  edition   = {1},
73
-  publisher = {Perro Triste},
74
-  location  = {México},
75
-  isbn      = {9786079718404},
76
-  pages     = {97--167},
77
-  url       = {https://archive.org/details/PropiedadIntelectual},
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-  urldate   = {2017-11-13},
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-  file      = {:recursos/pi.epub:ePUB},
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-  timestamp = {2017-11-13},
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-}
82
-
83
-@InCollection{levy2016,
84
-  author    = {Lévy, Pierre},
85
-  title     = {El anillo de oro},
86
-  booktitle = {¿Propiedad intelectual?},
87
-  year      = {2016},
88
-  date      = {2016-05-08},
89
-  subtitle  = {Una recopilación de ensayos críticos},
90
-  edition   = {1},
91
-  publisher = {Perro Triste},
92
-  location  = {México},
93
-  isbn      = {9786079718404},
94
-  pages     = {168--193},
95
-  url       = {https://archive.org/details/PropiedadIntelectual},
96
-  urldate   = {2017-11-13},
97
-  file      = {:recursos/pi.epub:ePUB},
98
-  timestamp = {2017-11-13},
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-}
100
-
101
-@Book{lessig2009,
102
-  author    = {Lessig, Lawrence},
103
-  title     = {El código 2.0},
104
-  year      = {2009},
105
-  publisher = {Traficantes de Sueños},
106
-  location  = {Madrid},
107
-  isbn      = {9788496453388},
108
-  pages     = {31--41},
109
-  url       = {https://www.traficantes.net/libros/el-codigo-20},
110
-  urldate   = {2017-11-13},
111
-  file      = {:recursos/lessig2009.pdf:PDF},
112
-  timestamp = {2017-11-13},
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-}
114
-
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-@Book{anderson1983,
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-  author    = {Anderson, Benedict},
117
-  title     = {Comunidades imaginadas},
118
-  year      = {1983},
119
-  publisher = {\textsc{fce}},
120
-  location  = {México},
121
-  url       = {https://github.com/NikaZhenya/maestria-asignaturas/raw/master/semestre_1/63044_t112_seminario_mercancia-capital-y-cinematografia/bibliografia/anderson_benedict-comunidades_imaginadas.pdf},
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-  urldate   = {2017-12-12},
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-  file      = {:recursos/anderson1983.pdf:PDF},
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-  timestamp = {2017-12-12},
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-}
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-
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-@Book{fujita2014,
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-  author     = {Fujita, Jun},
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-  title      = {Cine-capital},
130
-  year       = {2014},
131
-  translator = {Puente, Sebastián},
132
-  subtitle   = {Cómo las imágenes devienen revolucionarias},
133
-  publisher  = {Tinta Limón},
134
-  location   = {Buenos Aires},
135
-  url        = {https://github.com/NikaZhenya/maestria-asignaturas/raw/master/semestre_1/63044_t112_seminario_mercancia-capital-y-cinematografia/bibliografia/fujita_jun-cine-capital.pdf},
136
-  urldate    = {2017-12-12},
137
-  file       = {:recursos/fujita2014.pdf:PDF},
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-  timestamp  = {2017-12-12},
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-}
140
-
141
-@InCollection{zizek2008,
142
-  author     = {Zizek, Slavoj},
143
-  title      = {Arte e ideología en Hollywood. Una defensa del platonismo},
144
-  booktitle  = {Arte, ideología y capitalismo},
145
-  year       = {2008},
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-  translator = {Rendueles, César},
147
-  publisher  = {Ediciones Pensamiento},
148
-  location   = {Madrid},
149
-  pages      = {10--40},
150
-  url        = {https://github.com/NikaZhenya/maestria-asignaturas/raw/master/semestre_1/63044_t112_seminario_mercancia-capital-y-cinematografia/bibliografia/zizek_et_al-arte_ideologia_y_capitalismo.pdf},
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-  urldate    = {2017-12-12},
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-  file       = {:recursos/zizek2008.pdf:PDF},
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-  timestamp  = {2017-12-12},
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-}
155
-
156
-@InBook{kraniauskas2012,
157
-  author    = {Kraniauskas, John},
158
-  title     = {Políticas literarias},
159
-  year      = {2012},
160
-  subtitle  = {Poder y acumulación en la literatura y el cine latinoamericanos},
161
-  publisher = {Flacso},
162
-  location  = {México},
163
-  chapter   = {Cine y acumulación},
164
-  pages     = {199--262},
165
-  url       = {https://github.com/NikaZhenya/maestria-asignaturas/raw/master/semestre_1/63044_t112_seminario_mercancia-capital-y-cinematografia/bibliografia/kraniauskas_john-politicas_literarias.epub},
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-  urldate   = {2017-12-12},
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-  file      = {:recursos/kraniauskas2012.epub:ePUB},
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-  timestamp = {2017-12-12},
1
+@Article{hughes1988a,
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+  author    = {Hughes, Justin},
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+  title     = {The Philosophy of Intellectual Property},
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+  journal   = {Georgetown Law Journal},
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+  year      = {1988},
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+  groups    = {Primaria},
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+  keywords  = {Primaria},
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+  leido     = {true},
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+  timestamp = {2017-02-19},
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+  url       = {http://www.justinhughes.net/docs/a-ip01.pdf},
169 11
 }
170 12
 
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-@InBook{echeverria2008,
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-  author    = {Echeverría, Bolívar},
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-  title     = {La americanización de la modernidad},
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+@Inbook{moore2008a,
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+  chapter   = {Personality-Based, Rule-Utilitarian, and Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property},
15
+  pages     = {105--130},
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+  title     = {The Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics},
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+  publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons, Inc.},
174 18
   year      = {2008},
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-  publisher = {\textsc{unam / era}},
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-  location  = {México},
177
-  chapter   = {La modernidad americana (claves para su comprensión)},
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-  pages     = {199--262},
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-  url       = {https://github.com/NikaZhenya/maestria-asignaturas/raw/master/semestre_1/63044_t112_seminario_mercancia-capital-y-cinematografia/bibliografia/kraniauskas_john-politicas_literarias.epub},
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-  urldate   = {2017-12-12},
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-  file      = {:recursos/echeverria2008.pdf:PDF},
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-  timestamp = {2017-12-12},
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+  author    = {Moore, Adam D.},
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+  editor    = {Himma, Kenneth Einar},
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+  groups    = {Primaria},
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+  keywords  = {Primaria},
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+  leido     = {true},
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+  timestamp = {2017-02-19},
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+  url       = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1980852},
183 26
 }
184 27
 
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-@Article{moore2014,
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+@Article{moore2014a,
186 29
   author    = {Moore, Adam and Himma, Ken},
187 30
   title     = {Intellectual Property},
188 31
   journal   = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
189 32
   year      = {2014},
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-  editor    = {Edward N. Zalta},
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-  url       = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/intellectual-property/},
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+  publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
192 34
   edition   = {Winter 2014},
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-  file      = {:recursos/moore2014.html:URL},
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+  editor    = {Edward N. Zalta},
194 36
   groups    = {Primaria},
195 37
   keywords  = {Primaria},
196 38
   leido     = {true},
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-  publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
198 39
   timestamp = {2017-02-19},
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+  url       = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/intellectual-property/},
199 41
 }
200 42
 
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-@InBook{shiffrin2007,
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-  author    = {Shiffrin, Seana Valentine},
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-  title     = {A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy},
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-  year      = {2007},
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-  publisher = {Blackwell},
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+@Misc{schroeder2004a,
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+  author    = {Schroeder, Jeanne},
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+  title     = {Unnatural Rights: Hegel And Intellectual Propery},
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+  year      = {2004},
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+  groups    = {Primaria},
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+  keywords  = {Primaria},
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+  leido     = {false},
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+  timestamp = {2017-02-19},
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+  url       = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=518182},
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+}
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+
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+@Inbook{shiffrin2007a,
206 55
   chapter   = {Intellectual Property},
207 56
   pages     = {653--668},
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+  title     = {A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy},
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+  publisher = {Blackwell},
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+  year      = {2007},
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+  author    = {Shiffrin, Seana Valentine},
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+  groups    = {Primaria},
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+  keywords  = {Primaria},
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+  leido     = {true},
208 64
   url       = {https://www.academia.edu/3428807/Intellectual_Property},
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-  file      = {:recursos/shiffrin2007.pdf:PDF},
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+}
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+
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+@Article{stengel2004a,
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+  author    = {Daniel Stengel},
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+  title     = {Intellectual Property in Philosophy},
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+  journal   = {ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy},
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+  year      = {2004},
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+  publisher = {Franz Steiner Verlag},
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+  volume    = {90},
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+  number    = {1},
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+  pages     = {20--50},
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+  issn      = {0001-2343},
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   groups    = {Primaria},
211 78
   keywords  = {Primaria},
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   leido     = {true},
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+  notas     = {The article deals with the concept of intellectual property and its basis in different philosophical theories. First, the author gives a short historical overview of the development of intellectual property, locating its roots already in pre-historical society. It is followed by an examination of today's features of intellectual property, in contrast to 'regular' property. In the second part, the article analyses the theories of Locke, Kant, Hegel, Servan and Foucault to explain intellectual property, followed by a discussion which of their theories' features are reflected by today's intellectual property law.},
81
+  url       = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/23681627},
213 82
 }
214 83
 
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-@WWW{ompi2015,
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-  author    = {\textsc{ompi}},
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-  title     = {Comité Intergubernamental de la OMPI sobre Propiedad Intelectual y Recursos Genéticos, Conocimientos Tradicionales y Folclore},
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-  year      = {2015},
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-  url       = {http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/es/wipo_pub_tk_2.pdf},
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-  file      = {:recursos/ompi2015.pdf:PDF},
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-  timestamp = {2017-12-12},
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+@TechReport{cerlalc2015a,
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+  author      = {VV. AA.},
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+  title       = {América Latina: la balanza comercial en propiedad intelectual},
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+  institution = {CERLALC},
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+  year        = {2015},
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+  type        = {techreport},
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+  file        = {:recursos/cerlalc2015a.pdf:PDF},
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+  groups      = {Secundaria},
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+  keywords    = {Secundaria},
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+  url         = {https://github.com/NikaZhenya/taller-flacso/blob/master/6-sabado/recursos/cerlalc.pdf},
222 94
 }
223 95
 
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-@Comment{jabref-meta: databaseType:biblatex;}
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+@Inbook{hegel2003a,
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+  chapter   = {La cosa misma y la individualidad},
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+  pages     = {237--241},
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+  title     = {Fenomenología del Espíritu},
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+  publisher = {Fondo de Cultura Económica},
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+  year      = {2003},
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+  author    = {Hegel, G. W. F.},
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+}
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+
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+@Inbook{hegel1971a,
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+  chapter   = {Determinación próxima del principio de la historia universal},
107
+  pages     = {44--79},
108
+  title     = {Lecciones de Filosofía de la Historia},
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+  publisher = {Ediciones Zeus},
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+  year      = {1971},
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+  author    = {Hegel, G. W. F.},
112
+}
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+Intellectual Property (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2014 Edition)
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+<div id="aueditable"><!--DO NOT MODIFY THIS LINE AND ABOVE-->
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+
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+<h1>Intellectual Property</h1><div id="pubinfo"><em>First published Tue Mar 8, 2011; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014</em></div>
147
+
148
+<div id="preamble">
149
+
150
+<p>
151
+
152
+Intellectual property is generally characterized as non-physical
153
+property that is the product of original thought. Typically, rights do
154
+not surround the abstract non-physical entity; rather, intellectual
155
+property rights surround the control of physical manifestations or
156
+expressions of ideas. Intellectual property law protects a
157
+content-creator's interest in her ideas by assigning and enforcing
158
+legal rights to produce and control physical instantiations of those
159
+ideas.</p>
160
+
161
+<p>
162
+
163
+Legal protections for intellectual property have a rich history that
164
+stretches back to ancient Greece and before. As different legal
165
+systems matured in protecting intellectual works, there was a
166
+refinement of what was being protected within different areas.
167
+Over the same period several strands of moral justification for
168
+intellectual property were offered: namely, personality-based,
169
+utilitarian, and Lockean. Finally, there have been numerous
170
+critics of intellectual property and systems of intellectual property
171
+protection. This essay will discuss all of these topics, focusing
172
+on Anglo-American and European legal and moral conceptions of
173
+intellectual property.</p>
174
+
175
+</div>
176
+
177
+<div id="toc">
178
+<!--Entry Contents-->
179
+<ul>
180
+<li><a href="#HisIntPro">1. History of Intellectual Property</a></li>
181
+<li><a href="#DomIntPro">2. The Domain of Intellectual Property</a>
182
+   <ul>
183
+   <li><a href="#Cop">2.1 Copyright</a></li>
184
+   <li><a href="#CreComCopLic">2.2 The Creative Commons, Copyleft, and Licensing</a></li>
185
+   <li><a href="#Pat">2.3 Patents</a></li>
186
+   <li><a href="#TraSec">2.4 Trade Secret</a></li>
187
+   <li><a href="#Tra">2.5 Trademark</a></li>
188
+   <li><a href="#ProMerIde">2.6 Protecting Mere Ideas</a></li>
189
+   <li><a href="#DroMorConSysIntPro">2.7 Droits Morals: Continental Systems of Intellectual Property</a></li>
190
+   </ul></li>
191
+<li><a href="#JusCri">3. Justifications and Critiques</a>
192
+   <ul>
193
+   <li><a href="#PerBasJusIntPro">3.1 Personality-Based Justifications of Intellectual Property</a></li>
194
+   <li><a href="#UtiIncBasArgForIntPro">3.2 The Utilitarian Incentives-Based Argument for Intellectual Property</a></li>
195
+   <li><a href="#LocJusIntPro">3.3 Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property</a></li>
196
+   </ul></li>
197
+<li><a href="#GenCriIntPro">4. General Critiques of Intellectual Property</a>
198
+   <ul>
199
+   <li><a href="#InfNotPro">4.1 Information is Not Property </a></li>
200
+   <li><a href="#42InfNonRiv"> 4.2 Information is Non-Rivalrous</a></li>
201
+   <li><a href="#InfWanFre">4.3 Information Wants to be Free </a></li>
202
+   <li><a href="#FreSpeArgAgaIntPro">4.4 The Free Speech Argument against Intellectual Property</a></li>
203
+   <li><a href="#SocNatInfArg">4.5 The Social Nature of Information Argument</a></li>
204
+   <li><a href="#CosPubDigInf">4.6 The Cost of Publishing Digital Information</a></li>
205
+   </ul></li>
206
+<li><a href="#Bib">Bibliography</a></li>
207
+<li><a href="#Aca">Academic Tools</a></li>
208
+<li><a href="#Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></li>
209
+<li><a href="#Rel">Related Entries</a></li>
210
+</ul>
211
+<!--Entry Contents-->
212
+
213
+<hr />
214
+
215
+</div>
216
+
217
+<div id="main-text">
218
+
219
+<h2><a id="HisIntPro">1. History of Intellectual Property</a></h2>
220
+
221
+<p>
222
+
223
+One of the first known references to intellectual property
224
+protection dates from 500 B.C.E., when chefs in the Greek colony of
225
+Sybaris were granted year-long monopolies for creating particular
226
+culinary delights. There are at least three other notable
227
+references to intellectual property in ancient times&mdash;these
228
+cases are cited in Bruce Bugbee's formidable work <em>The Genesis of
229
+American Patent and Copyright Law</em> (Bugbee 1967). In the
230
+first case, Vitruvius (257&ndash;180 B.C.E.) is said to have revealed
231
+intellectual property theft during a literary contest in
232
+Alexandria. While serving as judge in the contest, Vitruvius
233
+exposed the false poets who were then tried, convicted, and disgraced
234
+for stealing the words and phrases of others.</p>
235
+
236
+<p>
237
+
238
+The second and third cases also come from Roman times (first century
239
+C.E.). Although there is no known Roman law protecting
240
+intellectual property, Roman jurists did discuss the different
241
+ownership interests associated with an intellectual work and how the
242
+work was codified&mdash;e.g., the ownership of a painting and the
243
+ownership of a table upon which the painting appears. There is also
244
+reference to literary piracy by the Roman epigrammatist Martial.
245
+In this case, Fidentinus is caught reciting the works of Martial
246
+without citing the source.</p>
247
+
248
+<p>
249
+
250
+These examples are generally thought to be atypical; as far as we know,
251
+there were no institutions or conventions of intellectual property
252
+protection in Ancient Greece or Rome. From Roman times to the
253
+birth of the Florentine Republic, however, there were many franchises,
254
+privileges, and royal favors granted surrounding the rights to
255
+intellectual works. Bugbee distinguishes between franchises or
256
+royal favors and systems of intellectual property in the following way:
257
+franchises and royal favors restrict access to intellectual works
258
+already in the public domain, thus these decrees take something from
259
+the people. An inventor, on the other hand, deprives the public
260
+of nothing that existed prior to the act of invention (Bugbee
261
+1967). One of the first statutes that protected authors'
262
+rights was issued by the Republic of Florence on June 19, 1421, to
263
+Filippo Brunelleschi, a famous architect. This statute not only
264
+recognized the rights of authors and inventors to the products of their
265
+intellectual efforts; it built in an incentive mechanism that became a
266
+prominent feature of Anglo-American intellectual property protection.
267
+For several reasons, including Guild influence, the Florentine patent
268
+statute of 1421 issued only the single patent to Brunelleschi. The
269
+basis of the first lasting patent institution of intellectual property
270
+protection is found in a 1474 statute of the Venetian Republic.
271
+This statute appeared 150 years before England's Statute of Monopolies;
272
+moreover, the system was sophisticated. The rights of inventors were
273
+recognized, an incentive mechanism was included, compensation for
274
+infringement was established, and a term limit on inventors'
275
+rights was imposed.</p>
276
+
277
+<p>
278
+
279
+American institutions of intellectual property protection are based
280
+on the English system that began with the Statute of Monopolies (1624)
281
+and the Statute of Anne (1710). The Statute of Monopolies granted
282
+fourteen-year monopolies to authors and inventors and ended the
283
+practice of granting rights to &ldquo;non-original/new&rdquo; ideas or works
284
+already in the public domain. In contrast to patent institutions
285
+in Europe, literary works remained largely unprotected until the
286
+arrival of Gutenberg's printing press in the fifteenth century.
287
+Even then there were few true copyrights granted&mdash;most were
288
+grants, privileges, and monopolies.</p>
289
+
290
+<p>
291
+
292
+The Statute of Anne (1710) is considered by scholars to be the first
293
+statute of modern copyright. The statute begins:</p>
294
+
295
+<blockquote>
296
+
297
+&ldquo;Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have lately
298
+frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing
299
+books without the consent of the authors and proprietors &hellip; to
300
+their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their
301
+families: for preventing therefore such practices for the future, and
302
+for the encouragement of learned men to compose and write use books, be
303
+it enacted &hellip;&rdquo; (Great Britain, <em>Statute of Anne</em>,
304
+1710)</blockquote>
305
+
306
+<p>
307
+
308
+The law gave protection to the author by granting fourteen-year
309
+copyrights, with a fourteen-year renewal possible if the author was
310
+still alive.</p>
311
+
312
+<p>
313
+
314
+In the landmark English case <em>Miller v. Taylor</em> (1769), the inherent
315
+rights of authors to control what they produce, independent of statute
316
+or law, was affirmed. While this case was later overruled in
317
+<em>Donaldson v. Becket</em> (1774), the practice of recognizing the
318
+rights of authors had begun. Other European countries, including
319
+Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Switzerland, followed the example set by
320
+England (Bugbee, 1967). Various more recent international
321
+treaties like the Berne Convention treaty and the TRIPS agreement have
322
+expanded the geographic scope of intellectual property protection to
323
+include most of the globe (Moore 2001).</p>
324
+
325
+<h2><a id="DomIntPro">2. The Domain of Intellectual Property</a></h2>
326
+
327
+<p>
328
+
329
+At the most practical level, the subject matter of intellectual
330
+property is largely codified in Anglo-American copyright, patent, and
331
+trade secret law, as well as in the moral rights granted to authors and
332
+inventors within the continental European doctrine. Although
333
+these systems of property encompass much of what is thought to count as
334
+intellectual property, they do not map out the entire landscape.
335
+Even so, Anglo-American systems of copyright, patent, trade secret, and
336
+trademark, along with certain continental doctrines, provide a rich
337
+starting point for understanding intellectual property (Moore 1998,
338
+2001). We'll take them up in turn.</p>
339
+
340
+<h3><a id="Cop">2.1 Copyright</a></h3>
341
+
342
+<p>
343
+
344
+The domain of copyright protection is original works of authorship
345
+fixed in any tangible medium of expression (17 U.S.C. &sect;102
346
+(1988)). Works that may be copyrighted include literary, musical,
347
+artistic, photographic, architectural, and cinematographic works;
348
+maps; and computer software. For something to be protected, it must be
349
+&ldquo;original&rdquo;&mdash;the work must be the author's own
350
+production; it cannot be the result of copying (<em>Bleistein v.
351
+Donaldson Lithographing Co</em>., 188 U.S. 239 (1903)). A further
352
+requirement that limits the domain of what can be copyrighted is that
353
+the expression must be &ldquo;non-utilitarian&rdquo; or
354
+&ldquo;non-functional&rdquo; in nature. Utilitarian products, or
355
+products that are useful for work, fall, if they fall anywhere, within
356
+the domain of patents.  Finally, rights only extend over the actual
357
+concrete expression and the derivatives of the expression&mdash;not to
358
+the abstract ideas themselves For example, Einstein's Theory of
359
+Relativity, as expressed in various articles and publications, is not
360
+protected under copyright law. Someone else may read these
361
+publications and express the theory in her own words and even receive
362
+a copyright for her particular expression. Some may find this
363
+troubling, but such rights are outside the domain of copyright
364
+law. The individual who copies abstract theories and expresses them in
365
+her own words may be guilty of plagiarism, but she cannot be held
366
+liable for copyright infringement.</p>
367
+
368
+<p>
369
+
370
+There are five exclusive rights that copyright owners enjoy, and three
371
+major restrictions on the bundle. The five rights are: the right
372
+to reproduce the work, the right to adapt it or derive other works from
373
+it, the right to distribute copies of the work, the right to display
374
+the work publicly, and the right to perform it publicly. Under
375
+U.S. copyright law, each of these rights may be individually parsed out
376
+and sold separately by the copyright owner. All five rights lapse
377
+after the lifetime of the author plus 70 years&mdash;or in the case
378
+of works for hire, the term is set at 95 years from publication or 120
379
+years from creation, whichever comes first. Aside from limited
380
+duration (17 U.S.C. &sect;302), the rules of fair use (17 U.S.C.
381
+&sect;107) and first sale (17 U.S.C. &sect;109(a)) also restrict the
382
+rights of copyright owners. Although the notion of &ldquo;fair use&rdquo; is
383
+notoriously hard to spell out, it is a generally recognized principle
384
+of Anglo-American copyright law that allows anyone to make limited use
385
+of another's copyrighted work for such purposes as criticism, comment,
386
+news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. The
387
+&ldquo;first sale&rdquo; rule prevents a copyright holder who has sold
388
+copies of a protected work from later interfering with the subsequent
389
+sale of those copies. In short, the owners of copies can do what
390
+they like with their property, short of violating the copyrights
391
+mentioned above.</p>
392
+
393
+<h3><a id="CreComCopLic">2.2 The Creative Commons, Copyleft, and Licensing</a></h3>
394
+
395
+<p>
396
+
397
+As a modern workaround for the first sale rule, many online content
398
+providers, rather than selling a copy of a work, simply offer licensing
399
+agreements (through click-wrap, shrink-wrap, etc.) that allow only
400
+specific uses of protected content. These approaches to protecting
401
+intellectual works are relatively new and seemingly build upon the
402
+copyright systems already in place. For example, by using
403
+licensing agreements to guarantee different levels of downstream
404
+access, the Creative Commons and Copyleft models seek to expand the
405
+commons of thought and expression (Stallman 1997; Lessig 2004).
406
+An owner may allow others to build upon a protected work provided that
407
+the &ldquo;new&rdquo; work is similarly accessible or usable.</p>
408
+
409
+<h3><a id="Pat">2.3 Patents</a></h3>
410
+
411
+<p>
412
+
413
+The domain or subject matter of patent law is the invention and
414
+discovery of new and useful processes, machines, articles of
415
+manufacture, or compositions of matter. There are three types of
416
+patents recognized by patent law: utility patents, design patents, and
417
+plant patents. Utility patents protect any new, useful, and nonobvious
418
+process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, as
419
+well as any new and useful improvement thereof. Design patents protect
420
+any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of
421
+manufacture. Finally, the subject matter of a plant patent is any new
422
+variety of plant. Patent protection is the strongest form of
423
+intellectual property protection, in that a twenty-year exclusive
424
+monopoly is granted to the owner over any expression or implementation
425
+of the protected work (35 U.S.C. &sect;101 (1988) and 35
426
+U.S.C. &sect;154(a)(2)). </p>
427
+
428
+<p>
429
+
430
+As with copyright, there are restrictions on the domain of patent
431
+protection. The U.S. Patent Act requires usefulness, novelty, and
432
+non-obviousness of the subject matter. The usefulness requirement
433
+is typically deemed satisfied if the invention can accomplish at least
434
+one of its intended purposes. Needless to say, given the expense
435
+of obtaining a patent, most machines, articles of manufacture, and
436
+processes are useful in this minimal sense.</p>
437
+
438
+<p>
439
+
440
+ A
441
+more robust requirement on the subject matter of a patent is that the
442
+invention defined in the claim for patent protection must be new or
443
+novel. There are several categories or events, all defined by
444
+statute, that can anticipate and invalidate a claim of a patent (35
445
+U.S.C. &sect;101 (1988)). In general, the novelty requirement
446
+invalidates patent claims if the invention was publicly known before
447
+the patent applicant invented it.</p>
448
+
449
+<p>
450
+
451
+In addition to utility and novelty, the third restriction on
452
+patentability is non-obviousness. United States patent law requires
453
+that the invention not be obvious to one ordinarily skilled in the
454
+relevant art at the time the invention was made. A hypothetical
455
+individual is constructed and the question is asked, &ldquo;Would this
456
+invention be obvious to an expert in the relevant field?&rdquo; If it
457
+would be obvious to this imaginary individual then the patent claim
458
+fails the test (35 U.S.C. &sect;103).</p>
459
+
460
+<p>
461
+
462
+In return for public disclosure and the ensuing dissemination of
463
+information, the patent holder is granted the right to make, use,
464
+sell, and authorize others to sell the patented item (35
465
+U.S.C. &sect;154 (1984 and Supp. 1989)). The bundle of rights
466
+conferred by a patent excludes others from making, using, or selling
467
+the invention regardless of independent creation. Like copyright,
468
+patent rights lapse after a given period of time&mdash;20 years for
469
+utility and plant patents, 14 for design patents. But unlike copyright
470
+protection, during their period of applicability these rights preclude
471
+others who independently invent the same process or machine from being
472
+able to patent or market their invention.</p>
473
+
474
+<h3><a id="TraSec">2.4 Trade Secret</a></h3>
475
+
476
+<p>
477
+
478
+The subject matter of trade secret law is almost unlimited in terms of
479
+the content or subject matter that may be protected and typically
480
+relies on private measures, rather than state action, to preserve
481
+exclusivity. &ldquo;A trade secret is any information that can be used
482
+in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
483
+sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential
484
+economic advantage over others&rdquo; (U.S. Legal Code, The
485
+Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, 1995, &sect;39). The secret
486
+may be a formula for a chemical compound; a process of manufacturing,
487
+treating, or preserving materials; a pattern for a machine or other
488
+device; or a list of customers.</p>
489
+
490
+<p>
491
+
492
+The two major restrictions on the domain of trade secrets are the
493
+requirements of secrecy and competitive advantage. An
494
+intellectual work is not a secret if it is generally known within the
495
+industry, published in trade journals, reference books, etc., or
496
+readily copyable from products on the market.</p>
497
+
498
+<p>
499
+
500
+Although trade secret rights have no built-in expiration, they are
501
+extremely limited in one important respect. Owners of trade
502
+secrets have exclusive rights to make use of the secret only as long as
503
+the secret is maintained. If the secret is made public by the
504
+owner, then trade secret protection lapses and anyone can make use of
505
+it. Moreover, owners' rights do not exclude independent
506
+invention or discovery. Within the secrecy requirement, owners of
507
+trade secrets enjoy management rights and are protected from
508
+misappropriation. This latter protection is probably the most
509
+important right granted, given the proliferation of industrial
510
+espionage and employee theft of intellectual works.</p>
511
+
512
+<h3><a id="Tra">2.5 Trademark</a></h3>
513
+
514
+<p>
515
+
516
+The domain or subject matter of trademark is, generally speaking, the
517
+good will or good name of a company. A trademark is any word,
518
+name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, adopted by a
519
+manufacturer or merchant to identify her goods and distinguish them
520
+from goods produced by others (15 U.S.C. &sect;1127 (1988)).</p>
521
+
522
+<p>
523
+
524
+ A major restriction on what can count as a trademark is whether or
525
+not the symbol is used in everyday language. In this respect, owners
526
+of trademarks do not want their symbols to become too widely used
527
+because once this occurs, the trademark lapses. An example of this
528
+restriction eliminating a word from trademark protection is
529
+&ldquo;aspirin&rdquo;&mdash;as the word became a part of the common
530
+culture, rights to exclusively use the trademark lapsed.</p>
531
+
532
+<p>
533
+
534
+Ownership of a trademark confers upon the property holder the right to
535
+use a particular mark or symbol and the right to exclude others from
536
+using the same (or similar) mark or symbol. The duration of these
537
+rights is limited only in cases where the mark or symbol ceases to
538
+represent a company or interest, or becomes entrenched as part of the
539
+common language or culture.</p>
540
+
541
+<h3><a id="ProMerIde">2.6 Protecting Mere Ideas</a></h3>
542
+
543
+<p>
544
+
545
+Outside of the regimes of copyright, patent, trade secret, and
546
+trademark, there is a substantial set of case law that allows
547
+individuals to protect mere ideas as personal property. This system of
548
+property is typically called the &ldquo;law of ideas&rdquo; (Epstein
549
+1992). A highly publicized case in this area is <em>Buchwald v.
550
+Paramount Pictures</em> (13 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1497 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1990)),
551
+concerning the Eddie Murphy movie <em>Coming to America</em>.</p>
552
+
553
+<p>
554
+
555
+The law of ideas is typically applied in cases where individuals
556
+produce ideas and submit them to corporations expecting to be
557
+compensated. In certain cases, when these ideas are used by the
558
+corporation (or anyone) without authorization, compensation may be
559
+required. Before concluding that an author has property rights to
560
+her idea(s), courts require the idea(s) to be novel or original
561
+(<em>Murray v. National Broadcasting,</em> 844 U.S. F2d 988 (Second
562
+Cir. 1988)) and concrete (<em>Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt</em> (D.C.
563
+Cir. 1953)). Compensation is offered only in cases of
564
+misappropriation (<em>Sellers v. American Broadcasting Co</em>. (11th
565
+Cir. 1982)).</p>
566
+
567
+<h3><a id="DroMorConSysIntPro">2.7 Droits Morals: Continental Systems of Intellectual Property</a></h3>
568
+
569
+<p>
570
+
571
+Article 6<em>bis</em> of the Berne Convention articulates the notion
572
+of &ldquo;moral rights&rdquo; that are included in continental
573
+European intellectual property law. The doctrine protects the personal
574
+rights of creators, as distinguished from their economic rights, and
575
+is generally known in France as &ldquo;droits morals&rdquo; or
576
+&ldquo;moral rights.&rdquo; These moral rights consist of the right to
577
+create and to publish a work in any form desired, the creator's right
578
+to claim the authorship of his work, the right to prevent any
579
+deformation, mutilation or other modification thereof, the right to
580
+withdraw and destroy the work, the prohibition against excessive
581
+criticism, and the prohibition against all other injuries to the
582
+creator's personality (Roeder 1940).</p>
583
+
584
+<h2><a id="JusCri">3. Justifications and Critiques</a></h2>
585
+
586
+<p>
587
+
588
+Arguments for intellectual property rights have generally taken one
589
+of three forms (Hughes 1988; Moore 2008). Personality theorists
590
+maintain that intellectual property is an extension of individual
591
+personality. Utilitarians ground intellectual property rights in social
592
+progress and incentives to innovate. Lockeans argue that rights
593
+are justified in relation to labor and merit. While each of these
594
+strands of justification has its weaknesses, there are also strengths
595
+unique to each.</p>
596
+
597
+<h3><a id="PerBasJusIntPro">3.1 Personality-Based Justifications of Intellectual Property</a></h3>
598
+
599
+<p>
600
+
601
+Personality theorists such as Hegel maintain that individuals have
602
+moral claims to their own talents, feelings, character traits, and
603
+experiences. We are self-owners in this sense. Control over physical
604
+and intellectual objects is essential for self-actualization&mdash;by
605
+expanding our selves outward beyond our own minds and mixing these
606
+selves with tangible and intangible items, we both define ourselves
607
+and obtain control over our goals and projects. For Hegel, the
608
+external actualization of the human will requires property (Hegel,
609
+1821). Property rights are important in two ways according to this
610
+view. First, by controlling and manipulating objects, both tangible
611
+and intangible, our will takes form in the world and we obtain a
612
+measure of freedom. Individuals may use their physical and
613
+intellectual property rights, for example, to shield their private
614
+lives from public scrutiny and to facilitate life-long project
615
+pursuit. Second, in some cases our personality becomes fused with an
616
+object&mdash;thus moral claims to control feelings, character traits,
617
+and experiences may be expanded to intangible works (Humboldt, 1792;
618
+Kohler, 1969).</p>
619
+
620
+<h4>3.1.1 Problems for Personality-Based Justifications of Intellectual
621
+Property</h4>
622
+
623
+<p>
624
+
625
+There are at least four problems with this view (Hughes 1988; Palmer
626
+2005; Schroeder 2006). First, it is not clear that we own our
627
+feelings, character traits, and experiences. While it is true
628
+that we have possession of these things or that they are a part of each
629
+of us, an argument is needed to establish the relevant moral
630
+claims.</p>
631
+
632
+<p>
633
+
634
+Second, even if it could be established that individuals own or have
635
+moral claims to their personality, it does not automatically follow
636
+that such claims are expanded when personalities become infused in
637
+tangible or intangible works. Rather than establishing property
638
+claims to such works, perhaps we should view this as an abandonment of
639
+personality&mdash;similar to the sloughing off of hair and skin
640
+cells. Moreover, misrepresenting an intellectual work (assuming
641
+there are no moral rights to these expressions) might change the
642
+perception of an author's personality, but it would not in fact
643
+change their personality.</p>
644
+
645
+<p>
646
+
647
+Third, assuming that moral claims to personality could be expanded
648
+to tangible or intangible items, we would still need an argument
649
+justifying property rights. Personality-based moral claims may
650
+warrant nothing more than use rights or prohibitions against
651
+alteration. Finally, there are many intellectual innovations in
652
+which there is no evidence of a creator's personality&mdash;a
653
+list of customers or a new safety-pin design, for instance (Hughes
654
+1988). Given these challenges, personality-based theories may not
655
+provide a strong moral foundation for legal systems of intellectual
656
+property.</p>
657
+
658
+<h4>3.1.2 The Personality Theorist's Rejoinder</h4>
659
+
660
+<p>
661
+
662
+Even if we acknowledge the force of these objections, there does seem
663
+to be something intuitively appealing about personality-based theories
664
+of intellectual property rights (Moore 2008). Suppose, for
665
+example, that Mr. Friday buys a painting at a garage sale&mdash;a
666
+long-lost Crusoe original. Friday takes the painting home and
667
+alters the painting with a marker, drawing horns and mustaches on the
668
+figures in the painting. The additions are so clever and fit so
669
+nicely into the painting that Friday hangs it in a window on a busy
670
+street. There are at least two ethical worries to consider in
671
+this case. First, the alterations by Friday may cause unjustified
672
+economic damage to Crusoe. Second, and independent of the
673
+economic considerations, Friday's actions may damage
674
+Crusoe's reputation. The integrity of the painting has been
675
+violated without the consent of the author, perhaps causing long-term
676
+damage to his reputation and community standing. If these claims
677
+are sensible, then it appears that we are acknowledging
678
+personality-based moral &ldquo;strings&rdquo; attaching to certain
679
+intellectual works. By producing intellectual works, authors and
680
+inventors put themselves on display, so-to-speak, and incur certain
681
+risks. Intellectual property rights afford authors and inventors
682
+a measure of control over this risk. To put the point a different
683
+way, it is the moral claims that attach to personality, reputation, and
684
+the physical embodiments of these individual goods that justify legal
685
+rules covering damage to reputation and certain sorts of economic
686
+losses.</p>
687
+
688
+<p>
689
+
690
+Moreover, personality-based theories of intellectual property often
691
+appeal to other moral considerations. Hegel's
692
+personality-based justification of intellectual property rights
693
+included an incentive-based component as well&mdash;he asserts that
694
+protecting the sciences promotes them, benefiting society (Hegel,
695
+1821). Perhaps the best way to protect these intuitively
696
+attractive personality-based claims to intangible works is to adopt a
697
+more comprehensive system designed to promote progress and social
698
+utility.</p>
699
+
700
+<h3><a id="UtiIncBasArgForIntPro">3.2 The Utilitarian Incentives-Based Argument for Intellectual Property</a></h3>
701
+
702
+<p>
703
+
704
+In terms of &ldquo;justification,&rdquo; modern Anglo-American systems
705
+of intellectual property are typically modeled as incentive-based and
706
+utilitarian (Oppenheim 1951; Machlup 1962; Boonin 1989; Hettinger
707
+1989; Mackaay 1990; Coskery 1993; Palmer 1997; Moore 2001,
708
+2003). On this view, a necessary condition for promoting the
709
+creation of valuable intellectual works is granting limited rights of
710
+ownership to authors and inventors. Absent certain guarantees,
711
+authors and inventors might not engage in producing intellectual
712
+property. Thus control is granted to authors and inventors of
713
+intellectual property, because granting such control provides
714
+incentives necessary for social progress. Although success is not
715
+ensured by granting these rights, failure is inevitable if those who
716
+incur no investment costs can seize and reproduce the intellectual
717
+effort of others (Moore 2001, 2003). Adopting systems of protection
718
+like copyright, patent, and trade secret yields an optimal amount of
719
+intellectual works being produced, and a corresponding optimal amount
720
+of social utility. Coupled with the theoretical claim that
721
+society ought to maximize social utility, we arrive at a simple yet
722
+powerful argument for the protection of intellectual property
723
+rights.</p>
724
+
725
+<h4>3.2.1 The Character of the Utilitarian Incentives-Based Argument: A Problem Shared by Both Sides </h4>
726
+
727
+<p>
728
+
729
+It is crucial to note that the issue of whether intellectual property
730
+protection does, or does not, sufficiently promote human happiness or
731
+well-being is an empirical question that requires empirical data in
732
+the form that the appropriate sociological and economic studies would
733
+provide.  Whether or not, for example, intellectual property
734
+protection provides an incentive that elicits some optimal output of
735
+content creation can be settled only by looking to the empirical
736
+evidence.  Likewise, whether or not intellectual property protection
737
+has the effect of hindering innovation and inhibiting the production
738
+of novel valuable content can be settled only by empirical
739
+evidence.</p>
740
+ 
741
+<p>
742
+At this point, more empirical research is needed by economists and
743
+sociologists, one way or another, to determine the effects of IP
744
+protection on technological and artistic development.  It is helpful
745
+to note that more empirically based research is being done to resolve
746
+these questions.  Carrier (2012), one especially noteworthy recent
747
+example, presents the results of interviews with 31 CEOs about the
748
+results of the Napster case, as well as examines the effects of
749
+copyright litigation.  Although a step in the right direction, Carrier
750
+(2012) illustrates some of the difficulties in obtaining persuasive
751
+empirical evidence.  Interviews, even with CEOs, are anecdotal in
752
+character on an issue that would seem to require, among other things,
753
+a comprehensive examination of the relative effects of providing
754
+various forms of protection to intellectual property on important
755
+indicators of economic efficiency.  The difficulties involved in
756
+obtaining such evidence suggest that the empirical question will
757
+remain debated for some time.</p>
758
+
759
+<h4>3.2.2 Problems for the Utilitarian Incentives-Based Argument</h4>
760
+
761
+<p>
762
+
763
+Given that this argument rests on providing incentives, what is
764
+needed to critique it are cases that illustrate better ways, or equally
765
+good ways, of stimulating production without granting private property
766
+rights to authors and inventors. It would be better to establish
767
+equally powerful incentives for the production of intellectual property
768
+that did not also require initial restricted use guaranteed by rights
769
+(Polanyi 1943; Machlup 1962; Hettinger 1989; Waldron 1993; Moore
770
+2001, 2003; Wright 1998).</p>
771
+
772
+<p>
773
+
774
+One alternative to granting intellectual property rights to inventors
775
+as incentive is government support of intellectual labor (Hettinger,
776
+1989; Calandrillo, 1998). This could take the form of
777
+government-funded research projects, with the results immediately
778
+becoming public property. The question becomes: can government
779
+support of intellectual labor provide enough incentive to authors and
780
+inventors so that an equal or greater amount of intellectual products
781
+are created compared to what is produced by conferring limited property
782
+rights? Better results may also be had if fewer intellectual
783
+works of higher quality were distributed to more people.</p>
784
+
785
+<p>
786
+
787
+Unlike the current government-supported system of intellectual property
788
+rights, reward models may be able to avoid the problems of allowing
789
+monopoly control and restricting access, and at the same time provide
790
+incentives to innovate (Shavell and Van Ypersele 2001). In this
791
+model, innovators would still burn the midnight oil chasing that pot of
792
+gold, and governments would not have to decide which projects to fund
793
+or determine the amount of the rewards before the works'
794
+&ldquo;social value&rdquo; was known. Funds necessary to pay the
795
+rewards could be drawn from taxes or collecting percentages of the
796
+profits of these innovations. Reward models may also avoid the
797
+disadvantages of monopoly pricing, and obstructions to further
798
+adaptation and innovation.</p>
799
+
800
+<p>
801
+
802
+Trade secret protection appears to be the most troubling from a
803
+utilitarian incentives-based perspective (Hettinger 1989). Given that
804
+no disclosure is necessary for trade secret protection, promoting
805
+trade secrets through incentives yields no reciprocal long-term social
806
+benefit. Trade secret protection allows authors and inventors the
807
+right to slow the dissemination of protected information
808
+indefinitely&mdash;a trade secret necessarily requires secrecy.</p>
809
+
810
+<p>
811
+
812
+Finally, empirical questions about the costs and benefits of
813
+copyright, patent, and trade secret protection are notoriously
814
+difficult to determine. Economists who have considered the
815
+question indicate that either the jury is out, or that other
816
+arrangements would be better (Machlup 1962; Priest 1986; Long 2000).
817
+If we cannot appeal to the progress-enhancing features of intellectual
818
+property protection, then the utilitarian can hardly appeal to such
819
+progress as justification.</p>
820
+
821
+<h4>3.2.3 The Utilitarian Rejoinder</h4>
822
+
823
+<p>
824
+
825
+The utilitarian may well agree with many of these criticisms and still
826
+maintain that intellectual property rights, in some form, are
827
+justified&mdash;a system of protection is better than nothing at all.
828
+Putting aside the last criticism, all of the worries surrounding the
829
+incentive-based approach appear to focus on problems of
830
+implementation.  We could tinker with our system of intellectual
831
+property, cutting back on some legal protections and strengthening
832
+others (Coskery 1993). Perhaps we could include more
833
+personality-based restrictions on what can be done with an intangible
834
+work after the first sale, limit the term of copyrights, patents, and
835
+trade secrets to something more reasonable, and find ways to embrace
836
+technologies that promote access while protecting incentives to
837
+innovate. The utilitarian might also remind us of the costs of
838
+changing our system of intellectual property.</p>
839
+
840
+<h3><a id="LocJusIntPro">3.3 Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property</a></h3>
841
+
842
+<p>
843
+
844
+A final strategy for justifying intellectual property rights begins
845
+with the claim that individuals are entitled to control the fruits of
846
+their labor (Hettinger 1989; Becker 1993; Gordon 1993; Moore 1997,
847
+1998, 2001, 2012; Hughes 1988; Palmer 2005; Himma 2005, 2006, 2008).
848
+Laboring, producing, thinking, and persevering are voluntary, and
849
+individuals who engage in these activities are entitled to what they
850
+produce. Subject to certain restrictions, rights are generated
851
+when individuals mix their labor with an unowned object. The
852
+intuition is that the person who clears unowned land, cultivates crops,
853
+builds a house, or creates a new invention obtains property rights by
854
+engaging in these activities.</p>
855
+
856
+<p>
857
+
858
+Consider a more formal version of Locke's famous argument. Individuals
859
+own their own bodies and labor&mdash;i.e., they are self-owners. When
860
+an individual labors on an unowned object, her labor becomes infused
861
+in the object and for the most part, the labor and the object cannot
862
+be separated. It follows that once a person's labor is joined with an
863
+unowned object, assuming that individuals exclusively own their body
864
+and labor, rights to control are generated. The idea is that there is
865
+an expansion of rights: we each own our labor and when that labor is
866
+mixed with objects in the commons, our rights are expanded to include
867
+these goods.</p>
868
+<h4>3.3.1 Objections to Locke</h4>
869
+
870
+<p>
871
+
872
+Locke's argument is not without difficulties. Jeremy
873
+Waldron (1983) argued that the idea of mixing one's labor is
874
+incoherent&mdash;actions cannot be mixed with objects. P. J.
875
+Proudhon (1840) argued that if labor was important, the second labor on
876
+an object should ground a property right in an object as reliably as
877
+the first labor. Nozick (1974) asked why labor mixing generated
878
+property rights rather than a loss of labor. Waldron (1983) and
879
+Perry (1978) have argued that mixing one's labor with an unowned
880
+object should yield more limited rights than rights of full
881
+ownership. Finally, if the skills, tools, and inventions used in
882
+laboring are social products, then perhaps individual claims to title
883
+have been undermined (Grant 1987; Hettinger 1989).</p>
884
+
885
+<h4>3.3.2 The Lockean Rejoinder</h4>
886
+
887
+<p>
888
+
889
+Among defenders of Lockean-based arguments for private property,
890
+these challenges have not gone unnoticed (Spooner 1855; Schmidtz
891
+1990; Mack 1990; Simmons 1992; Child 1990; Moore 1997, 2001, 2012).
892
+Rather than rehearsing the points and counterpoints,
893
+consider a modified version of the Lockean argument&mdash;one that
894
+does not so easily fall prey to the objections mentioned above (Moore,
895
+2001, 2012):</p>
896
+
897
+<p>
898
+
899
+After weeks of effort and numerous failures, suppose Ginger comes up
900
+with an excellent new recipe for spicy Chinese noodles&mdash;a recipe
901
+that she keeps in her mind and does not write down. Would anyone argue
902
+that Ginger does not have at least some minimal moral claim to control
903
+the recipe? Suppose that Fred samples some of Ginger's noodles and
904
+desires to purchase the recipe. Is there anything morally suspicious
905
+with an agreement between them that grants Fred a limited right to
906
+use Ginger's recipe provided that Fred does not disclose the process?
907
+Alas, Fred didn't have to agree to the terms and, no matter how tasty
908
+the noodles, he could eat something else or create his own
909
+recipe. Arguably, part of the moral weightiness of the agreement
910
+between Ginger and Fred relies on the fact that Ginger holds legitimate
911
+title to the recipe.</p>
912
+
913
+<p> In small communities it may even be possible to contract with all
914
+of one's fellows securing all or some of the bundle of full ownership.
915
+In this sort of example, every single member of the community would be
916
+directly part of the agreement.  Ginger says to her peers, &ldquo;if you
917
+want access to my recipe, then you will have to agree to my right to
918
+enjoy income&rdquo; and they reply &ldquo;but such rights can't be indefinite
919
+&hellip; we as a community won't be on the hook for defending this
920
+agreement indefinitely.&rdquo;  In the ensuing give-and-take an agreement is
921
+hammered out.  It is important to note that the moral bindingness of
922
+such an agreement is crucially dependent on the initial set of
923
+entitlement claims generated by labor, desert, and non-worsening.  If
924
+Ginger, in this case, was not the author of the recipe &mdash; suppose
925
+she took it from someone else &mdash; it is not at all clear that the
926
+resulting contract would be morally or legally binding.</p>
927
+
928
+<p>
929
+Moving from small communities to larger ones a more general form of
930
+agreement between authors, inventors, and society can be considered.
931
+If intellectual works are to be held as anything other than trade
932
+secrets, walled off with narrow contracts like non-disclosure
933
+agreements or non-competition arrangements, there must be a way of
934
+securing access.  Society may purchase access by offering limited
935
+rights to authors and inventors.  Moreover, if some society does not
936
+offer this sort of protection, then innovators would likely employ
937
+their talents in other areas or simply move to a society where such
938
+agreements are recognized (Moore 2012).  </p>
939
+
940
+<h2><a id="GenCriIntPro">4. General Critiques of Intellectual Property</a></h2>
941
+
942
+<p>
943
+
944
+Putting aside the strands of argument that seek to justify moral
945
+claims to intangible works and the rather focused problems with these
946
+views, there are several general critiques of the rights to control
947
+intellectual property to consider.</p>
948
+
949
+<h3><a id="InfNotPro">4.1 Information is Not Property </a></h3>
950
+
951
+<p>
952
+
953
+Critics argue that information is not the kind of thing that can be
954
+owned or possessed and is not something that can be property, as that
955
+notion is typically defined.  Information objects, such as numbers and
956
+propositions are abstract objects, which cannot causally interact with
957
+material objects, and hence cannot be owned or possessed.  The idea,
958
+for example, that one could, in the relevant sense, possess and hence
959
+own the novel expressed by the book <em>A Tale of Two Cities</em>
960
+makes as little sense as the idea that one could possess and hence own
961
+the entity denoted by the symbol &ldquo;2.&rdquo; Whatever concepts
962
+might properly be applied to abstract objects, on this view, the
963
+concept of property, according to these theorists, does not.  As a
964
+conceptual matter, the term &ldquo;intellectual property,&rdquo; at
965
+best, applies to nothing and, at worst, is incoherent. </p>
966
+
967
+<p>This analysis is vulnerable to at least two objections.  First, it
968
+is not clear that ownership, as a conceptual matter, requires physical
969
+possession.  One can argue that the essence of ownership consists in a
970
+power &mdash; the power to exclude others from certain behaviors
971
+involving the relevant entity &mdash; and not in physical control or
972
+possession of the entity. Second, the claim that information objects
973
+cannot be property does not imply that it is illegitimate to grant to
974
+authors or content-creators a legal right to exclude others from
975
+appropriating those objects without their consent.  That some entity E
976
+is not &ldquo;property&rdquo; implies only that it should not be legally protected
977
+qua property; it does not imply that E should not be protected in very
978
+similar ways.  It might be that such legal rights should be called
979
+something other than &ldquo;intellectual property rights,&rdquo; but these rights
980
+could be called something else, such as, for example, &ldquo;intellectual
981
+content rights.&rdquo;</p>
982
+
983
+<h3><a id="42InfNonRiv"> 4.2 Information is Non-Rivalrous</a></h3>
984
+
985
+<p>
986
+
987
+Many have argued that the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual works
988
+grounds a prima facie case against rights to restrict access.
989
+Since intellectual works are not typically consumed by their use and
990
+can be used by many individuals concurrently (making a copy does not
991
+deprive anyone of their possessions), we have a strong case against
992
+moral and legal intellectual property rights (Kuflik 1989; Hettinger
993
+1989; Barlow 1997). One reason for the widespread pirating of
994
+intellectual works is that many people think restricting access to
995
+these works is unjustified. Consider a more formal version of
996
+this argument:</p>
997
+
998
+<dl class="hangindent">
999
+
1000
+<dt>P1.</dt><dd> If a tangible or intangible work can be used and consumed by
1001
+many individuals concurrently (is non-rivalrous), then maximal access
1002
+and use should be permitted.</dd>
1003
+
1004
+<dt>
1005
+P2.</dt><dd> Intellectual works falling under the domains of copyright,
1006
+patent, and trade secret protection are non-rivalrous.</dd>
1007
+
1008
+<dt>
1009
+C3.</dt><dd> It follows that there is an immediate prima facie case
1010
+<em>against</em> intellectual property rights, or <em>for</em> allowing
1011
+maximal access to intellectual works.</dd>
1012
+</dl>
1013
+
1014
+<p>
1015
+
1016
+The weak point in this argument is the first premise (Moore 2001, 2010, 2012;
1017
+Himma, 2005). Consider sensitive personal information.
1018
+Moore argues that it false to claim that just because this information
1019
+can be used and consumed by many individuals concurrently, a prima
1020
+facie moral claim to maximal access is established. This argument
1021
+applies as well to snuff films, obscene pornography, information
1022
+related to national security, personal financial information, and
1023
+private thoughts; each are non-rivalrous, but this fact does not by
1024
+itself generate prima facie moral claims for maximal access and
1025
+use. Moreover, it is not clear that unauthorized copying does no
1026
+harm to the owner even in cases where the copier would not have
1027
+purchased a copy legitimately (and thus is not denying the owner
1028
+economic compensation they would otherwise receive). Unauthorized
1029
+copying creates un-consented to risks that owners must
1030
+shoulder.</p>
1031
+
1032
+<p>
1033
+
1034
+Himma points out that, by itself, the claim that consumption of
1035
+information is non-rivalrous does not imply that we have a right of any
1036
+kind to those objects. While this certainly provides a reason
1037
+against thinking protection of intellectual property is morally
1038
+justified, it does not tell us anything about whether we have a right
1039
+of some sort because it does not contain any information about morally
1040
+relevant properties of human beings&mdash;and the justification of
1041
+general rights-claims necessarily rests on attributions of value that
1042
+implicitly respond to interests of beings with the appropriate level of
1043
+moral standing&mdash;in our case, our status as persons (Himma
1044
+2005).</p>
1045